Today will mark the day when 500 million barrels of oil will be lost due to the Israel/US war on Iran. Based on Vortexa data, about 190mb are trapped inside the Straits of Hormuz, while the daily loss of crude and product liftings from the Middle East has reached close to 17mbd - a bit less than 12mbd for crude/condensate and more than 5mbd for oil products.
These figures are already considering an extra 3mbd of crude from Yanbu (Saudi Arabia), and they are based on 2025 average figures. Relative to the pre-war highs of exports, the loss could even be 20mbd.
A lot of people are wondering why prices are not higher at this point in time -- the typical reference is ICE Brent: this is -
1) a paper contract (and there may be quite some strategic selling going on)
2) it is two months out in the future
3) and it reflects an Atlantic Basin light-sweet crude oil
The latter is important, because the pressing shortage occurs in East of Suez medium-sour crude, as well as in refined products. Very roughly speaking, jet and diesel prices in Asia and Europe are assessed at $200/b already. Finally, there is the crucial aspect of the length of the supply chain. We have lost a net 16.6mbd of crude and products from the Middle East for two full weeks now, pushing crude/condensate at sea to Asia already to a seasonal record low as of now (when excluding Iranian barrels).
But as for global arrivals of oil, only last week showed the first marked decline of 8.5mbd vs the 2025 average. In other words, so far oil arrivals have been - at large - unaffected by the Middle Eastern escalation, but as of this week things are really set to change. Everyday matters, and the gravity of the situation is now also recognised by US President Trump, who at least appears to be in search for an exit strategy. As said before, this is a Covid-size crisis, but with the crucial difference that comes from the supply and not the demand side. If continued, prices will have to move a lot higher to push consumers into Covid-style activity levels. The indirect effects on consumer prices (agriculture, clothes, cars, electronics, ...) are far from being reflected at this point in time.
Meanwhile, the 500mb are about equal to the combined IEA and US policy measures (SPR releases, waivers on Russian and Iranian sanctions). However, the release rate of these barrels will be far slower than the 17mbd loss, with loads of question marks on the Iranian barrels and a slow start to the US SPR release.