This is partly due to strategic pressure from China. Beijing has exerted its influence, particularly as Iran relies heavily on Chinese revenue for oil exports. China used this leverage to help broker a stable ceasefire in Yemen, easing tensions with GCC countries. If Iran were to reignite crises like those targeting Saudi Aramco facilities, it would jeopardize its relationship with China, which is crucial for its economic survival. I doubt the more rational elements of Iran’s decision-making apparatus would allow such provocations to resume at the same intensity. However, the region remains highly volatile. We must also consider shifting regional dynamics; strategic partnerships often depend on shared objectives. For example, the foundation of Iran and Russia’s collaboration was their mutual interests in Syria. If the war in Ukraine ends, a key question will be whether Russia continues its strategic partnerships in the Gulf. Russia’s investments in the Gulf and reciprocal Gulf investments in Russia have been pragmatic and mutually beneficial. If the war concludes, these relationships may shift, raising questions about their long-term sustainability.
Turkey assumes pivotal regional role
Without Turkey, Syria remains insecure and politically unstable, so any investments there will require its agreement. Turkey’s contractors are also well-equipped for reconstruction, and the Syrian economy aligns closely with Turkish industries. Any major investments or partnerships in the region will now need to account for Turkey’s strategic priorities and growing role in shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics and energy markets.